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DECISION OF THE TRAFFIC COMMISSIONER FOR WALES

PUBLIC INQUIRY HELD AT PONTYPRIDD ON 3 SEPTEMBER 2025

Call a Cab (Carmarthenshire) Ltd (PG1125880) and Transport Manager David Anthony Evans

Background

Call a Cab (Carmarthenshire) Ltd holds a Standard National PSV Operator鈥檚 Licence authorising 10 vehicles, granted on 15 July 2014. There are four company directors, Peter Hughes, Germaine Hughes, Gareth Williams and Elizabeth Williams. David Anthony Evans is the transport manager on the licence and was appointed to that role on 10 November 2023. There is previous compliance history on the licence.聽 The operator attended a public inquiry in July 2019 following an unsatisfactory maintenance investigation when the licence was curtailed to 6 vehicles for a period of one month and undertakings were attached to the licence.聽 The operator again attended public inquiry in September 2022 following unsatisfactory maintenance and traffic examiner investigations.聽 The licence was curtailed to 7 vehicles for a period of 21 days and the operator鈥檚 repute was found to be tarnished. The operator is primarily involved in school transport for Carmarthenshire Council, using both taxis (Private Hire Vehicles licensed by the Local Authority), and Public Service Vehicles under this licence. The company currently services 8 school contracts using the licensed PSVs, all relating to children with special educational needs.

On 14 December 2024 the Driver and Vehicle Standards Agency (鈥淒VSA鈥�) encountered one of the operator鈥檚 vehicles during an operation targeting vehicles used commercially for carrying passengers in Swansea city centre.聽 The DVSA examiners issued an immediate 鈥淪鈥� marked prohibition notice to the vehicle due to defective brakes. That triggered an unannounced DVSA maintenance investigation carried out by Vehicle Examiner (鈥淰E鈥�) Mark Davies at the operator鈥檚 premises on 13 March 2025.聽 His report following investigation was 鈥渦nsatisfactory鈥� and highlighted numerous concerns including the following:

• Inspection/maintenance records 鈥� safety inspection records not properly completed; late safety inspections; brake tests not all being completed at safety inspections, with some carried out up to 11 days later; brake tests being carried out using incorrect weights; concerns about maintenance standards with instances of defects found at inspection marked as 鈥渕onitor鈥� but not repaired as they should have been, and concerns that in house maintenance staff not specifically trained in repair/maintenance of PSVs;

• The same shortcomings found during the previous DVSA investigation that resulted in call to inquiry in 2022 still present with the annual test failure rate and prohibition assessment having deteriorated since then and an undertaking given at public inquiry as to roller brake testing not being fulfilled;

• Delayed 鈥淪鈥� marked prohibitions issued by VE Davies during his visit fleet check to vehicle FJ12CHZ for missing break glass hammer for the roof emergency exit, the vehicle鈥檚 chassis main structure excessively corroded and holed, and the emissions control equipment (Diesel Particulate Filter鈥� 鈥淒PF鈥�) absent, having been illegally removed. The examiner attributed the corrosion and absence of the DPF to poor maintenance;

• Driver defect walkaround and reporting system inadequate with evidence of defects which should have been reported by drivers being found at the roadside and regularly at safety inspections. Ineffective management of reported defects with no evidence of what repair work was carried out; and

• Transport manager demonstrated ineffective control of the transport operation.

The operator was called to a public inquiry at Pontypridd to consider these issues. David Anthony Evans, transport manager, was also called to the inquiry to consider whether he continued to meet the requirements to be of good repute and to be professionally competent.

Hearing

The Public Inquiry was listed for 3 September at 10.00am at the Office of the Traffic Commissioner for Wales in Pontypridd.聽 It went ahead and was concluded on that date.聽 Directors, Anthony Hughes and Gareth Williams appeared on behalf of the company, represented by Jeremy Woodcraft, of Keystone Law. David Anthony Evans, transport manager, attended unrepresented. VE Mark Davies attended from the DVSA, remotely via Microsoft Teams.

Evidence

In addition to the papers in the PI Briefs for the operator and transport manager I had also been provided, in advance of the hearing, with additional evidence.聽 On behalf of the operator this consisted of a witness statement from company director Anthony Hughes with various documents attached and the finance documents which were requested in the call-in letter (which demonstrated that the financial standing requirement was met). The operator had been directed to send specific maintenance records to VE Davies, and he had prepared a supplementary statement for the Public Inquiry hearing having reviewed those documents (VE Davies鈥� statement of 19 August 2025).聽 That supplementary statement was served on the operator and transport manager in advance of the inquiry hearing.聽 David Anthony Evans submitted a statement for the public inquiry hearing (undated) which was lodged by the operator along with its own additional evidence.

Mr Woodcraft indicated that the DVSA evidence included in the public inquiry brief and supplementary statement was not contested by his client. Similarly, Mr Evans did not contest the DVSA evidence.聽 VE Davies was questioned by me and by Mr Woodcraft, in particular, regarding the removal of the DPF 鈥� when that had been removed and why he considered that would have been obvious to the operator, and the likely reason for doing so.

Anthony Hughes, Gareth Williams and David Evans gave evidence, responding to questions from both Mr Woodcraft and from me.聽 I heard closing submissions from Mr Woodcraft, and I then reserved my decision.

Findings of fact

It is clear from the DVSA evidence, which was accepted by the operator, that safety inspections were not all carried out when they should have been 鈥� the DVSA safety inspection summary (page 75 of the PI Brief) indicates that of the records checked by VE Davies, 28% of the inspections were late. Accordingly, I find that statements made by the operator when applying for the licence have not been fulfilled, namely that vehicles would be inspected at the six weekly intervals the operator promised they would be and find that section 17(3)(a) of the Act is made out.

The evidence is clear that the operator failed to comply with the undertakings on the licence that its vehicles would be kept fit and serviceable as evidenced by the prohibition notices issued and poor MOT pass rate at the time of VE Davies鈥� visit in March 2025 and at the time of the inquiry hearing. It also failed to comply with the undertaking that drivers would report promptly defects or symptoms of defects that could prevent the safe operation of vehicles, and that any defects would be promptly recorded in writing. There were instances of driver reportable defects found at safety inspections, with the examiner finding that to be the case on 30% of the records he checked.聽 Concerningly, the serious and significant immediate prohibition notice on 14 December 2024, which triggered this investigation, was for a parking brake that had insufficient reserve travel 鈥� meaning the handbrake lever was in the fully applied position 鈥� where the brake was not holding sufficiently. The DVSA found that, when the vehicle was jacked off the ground with the handbrake fully applied the wheel was rotating freely, showing that the parking brake was completely inoperative on that wheel.聽 That should have been identified at the vehicles鈥� most recent safety inspection, 2 days before the vehicle was encountered in Swansea city centre.聽 Subsequent analysis of the inspection records revealed that the vehicle was not brake tested until 8 days after the inspection report was completed.聽 That was in breach of vehicle safety standards in the Guide to Maintaining Roadworthiness, and in clear breach of the licence undertaking given by the operator to the traffic commissioner at public inquiry in 2019 that there would be a rolling brake test at every safety inspection. The inspection record states, 鈥減arking brake travel 鈥� monitor鈥�, indicating that the maintenance staff were aware that the hand brake lever was at the end of its travel.聽 That should have been investigated at the time and repaired, with a brake test carried out. However, instead, the inspection report was signed off by the maintenance staff as 鈥渞oadworthy鈥�, with the prohibition notice issued only 2 days later.聽 There was a driver defect report on 26 October 2024 when a driver reported 鈥渉andbrake lever taking a lot of pull to hold鈥�.聽 That document is stamped with the operator鈥檚 stamp and signed by the transport manager on 28 October 2024 but with no evidence of defect assessment or repair, indicating that this defect had been present and developing since October 2024, with no action taken by the operator.聽 This defect presented a clear and serious road safety risk to passengers and the travelling public.聽 The delayed prohibition issued during VE Davies鈥� fleet check in March for an excessively corroded and holed vehicle chassis was another serious defect which should have been obvious to the maintenance staff at the most recent safety inspection. VE Davies鈥� evidence was that the corrosion was such that the metal disintegrated to the touch, resulting in an increased risk of suspension component detaching, with potential loss of control of the vehicle. Again, his analysis of the inspection records showed that the defect was identified but the action taken was 鈥渕onitor鈥�, when the corrosion was clearly excessive and required actioning immediately.聽 Accordingly, I find that section 17(3)(aa) of the Act is made out.

It is undisputed that the operator has been issued with prohibition notices by the DVSA in the past 5 years. Accordingly, I find that section 17(3)(c) of the Act is made out.

I have carefully considered the evidence about the illegally removed DPF included in VE Davies鈥� maintenance investigation visit report (at pages 58, 60 and 66) and his oral evidence given at public inquiry, and Anthony Hughes鈥� evidence in his written statement and given at inquiry. Aside from the question of the cost of a new DPF, the operator did not dispute VE Davies鈥� evidence about the DPF.聽 The DPF had been illegally removed, certainly in the 12 months prior to March 2025 but, according to VE Davies when questioned, most probably more recently than that. His evidence was that the operator/maintenance staff must have had knowledge of the procedure having been carried out because the vehicle would have undergone a software modification to prevent the Engine Management Light (EML) illuminating. The only explanation for an operator seeking to do so, according to VE Davies, would have been to save costs, given the expense of a new DPF. VE Davies initially indicated that could cost up to 拢5,000 but, when questioned by Mr Woodcraft, accepted that it would be significantly less for a small PSV of the type operated by this operator, possibly in the region of 拢800. His evidence was that the cost of removing the DPF would be approximately 拢300-拢400.聽 The operator could not explain why, how, when or by whom the DPF was removed. Mr Hughes鈥� statement suggested the possibility that this may have been done by a vehicle dealer in Sheffield (now deceased) who had replaced the vehicle鈥檚 engine whilst under warranty.聽 However, when questioned about the timing of that engine repair, Mr Hughes鈥� evidence was that the engine was repaired in Sheffield around 2022 or 2023, which was a long time before the DPF was removed. The DPF was certainly not removed before March 2024, and more likely sometime after that. Mr Hughes accepted that this possible suggested scenario simply did not add up, but he could provide no alternative explanation as to what happened.聽 If I were to find that the operator had deliberately removed the DPF to gain a clear commercial advantage and/or had attempted to conceal an offence of illegally removing the DPF that would place this case in the most severe category when considering regulatory action and quite obviously, and separately from any other issues, bring into question the operator鈥檚 good repute and fitness to hold a licence.聽 It is concerning that the operator was operating a vehicle with emissions control equipment that had been illegally removed 鈥� at the very least that suggests a lack of control of its maintenance systems.聽 However, I cannot see the rationale for carrying out this illegal procedure for a potential financial gain of only 拢400 - 拢500.聽 That is not, in my view a 鈥渃lear commercial advantage鈥� and I agree with Mr Woodcraft that, given the investments made in other areas of the business, such as IT systems and the fleet, there was no evident motivation for this operator to do so. On the balance of probabilities and reminding myself of the proposition that the more serious the allegation the more cogent is the evidence required, I am unable to make such a finding.

I find that there have been persistent operator licence failures, with many of the same failures found by the DVSA in their previous maintenance investigations in 2019 and 2022 still present at the time of their visit in March 2025.聽 Previous adverse findings were made at public inquiries in 2019 and, more recently, in 2022 when I made the same adverse findings that I make now, and when I found the operator鈥檚 repute tarnished. Despite a satisfactory audit report in February 2023 (prepared in compliance with a licence undertaking given at the public inquiry in 2022), the changes made and assurances given to me by the operator were not followed through 鈥� as evidenced by the DVSA prohibitions in 2024 and report of March 2025. This is the operator鈥檚 third call to public inquiry in the past 6 years following unsatisfactory maintenance investigations and at each inquiry there have been concerns raised about brake testing with a bespoke licence undertaking attached to the operator鈥檚 licence in 2019 that it had failed to honour when it appeared before me in 2022 and, again was failing to honour in March of this year when the DVSA investigated and reported continuing concerns. Not only were there missing and late brake tests, including the brake test on the vehicle encountered on 14 December 2024, but there was evidence of tests taking place up to 11 days after the inspection, with one instance of 1800 miles covered between the safety inspection and the brake test. There were defects recorded as 鈥渕onitor 鈥� replace next PMI鈥� which were not then replaced at the next PMI, including defects relating to safety critical areas.聽 Brake pipes were found to be corroded and recorded on multiple inspection records and then eventually the action taken was 鈥渢reated鈥� rather than replaced which, in VE Davies鈥� view was poor practice for hydraulic brake systems.聽 I do note VE Davies鈥� evidence in his supplementary report and given by him at PI that, from the 5 safety inspection records he reviewed for the period May 鈥� July 2025, there appeared to have been a significant improvement in that three-month period.聽 However, since the last public inquiry in 2022, the operator鈥檚 mechanical prohibition rate has deteriorated and there have been two 鈥淪鈥� marked prohibitions since then 鈥� one to a vehicle in service for serious braking issues, which could have had catastrophic consequences. Both prohibitions involved defects which the operator was on notice of and which could and should have addressed before the defects were found by the DVSA. The operator鈥檚 MOT pass rate has worsened since the last public inquiry. The initial fail rate at MOT is now 31.82%, which is three times higher than the national PSV average (10.36%). There was ineffective management control and insufficient procedures in place to prevent the operator licence compliance failings found by the DVSA.聽 There was ineffective or insufficient driver training with insufficient monitoring and disciplinary procedures in place, particularly as regards driver defect reporting.聽 All of these findings lead me to conclude that road safety and fair competition have been significantly compromised by the operator鈥檚 actions.

David Anthony Evans has been the nominated transport manager on this licence since 10 November 2023.聽 Prior to that, he worked for the operator as a driver and the company paid for him to obtain his transport manager qualification in 2023 when the previous transport manger, Malcolm Davie, retired.聽 David Evans was not the transport manager at the time of the previous public inquiry in 2022.聽 That was Malcolm Davie and his repute as transport manager was found to be tarnished in view of the adverse findings made then. I have not included any of the evidence that pre-dates David Evans鈥� tenure as transport manager in my consideration of whether he continues to meet the requirements to be of good repute and professionally competent, as required by the relevant legislation.

However, I find that the serious compliance failures found by the DVSA in 2024 and 2025 did occur whilst he was transport manager on the licence, including the seriously deficient driver defect reporting and repair system and brake testing arrangements, which were not only non-compliant with the Guide to Maintaining Roadworthiness, but also in clear breach of a bespoke brake testing undertaking attached to the licence and which the operator had already been found to been in breach of at a previous public inquiry in 2022.聽 Although Mr Evans was not the transport manager in 2022, I would expect any transport manager to ensure that brake testing arrangements comply with best practice guidance, and to ensure compliance with specific undertakings attached to the operator鈥檚 licence.聽 He clearly had no control over what drivers were doing in terms of walkaround checks or reporting and nor did he have control over the maintenance systems, as highlighted in the DVSA report. When asked what, if anything he did when he reviewed the safety inspection reports which recorded defects with 鈥渕onitor鈥� next to them, his evidence was that he had discussed with the maintenance staff.聽 However, he fully accepted that he had not done what he should have done as transport manager and the action he took was 鈥渘ot good enough鈥�.聽 In his evidence he stated that he was not seeking to excuse his actions and that he realised now that there could potentially have been a death from the brake issue, which was acknowledged was serious and which is what had triggered the DVSA maintenance investigation.聽 He had overseen repeated instances of serious defects being marked on safety inspections as 鈥渕onitor鈥� but had done nothing to check what the maintenance staff were doing to investigate the defects and, crucially, he had not required the maintenance staff to report back to him following monitoring/investigations, as he acknowledged he should have done.聽 He had been passive and put his faith and trust in the maintenance staff due to naivety and because he assumed that what was being done and the systems that were in place under the previous transport manager were adequate.聽 Malcolm Davie鈥檚 repute was found to be tarnished at the public inquiry in 2022, however there was an audit report in February 2023, before Malcolm Davie retired, which found that systems were compliant then.聽 I have no evidence before me of exactly when the maintenance compliance standards and systems slipped so badly after that date.聽 However, David Evans took over as transport manager in November 2023 and he accepted that he had not been in full control, particularly regarding the defect reporting and brake testing. Accordingly, I find on the evidence and the balance of probabilities that David Anthony Evans failed effectively and continuously to manage the operator鈥檚 transport activities, as required by the legislation.

Considerations and Decisions in respect of the operator

I have weighed up the adverse findings set out above with the positive features in this case in considering regulatory action.聽 On the positive side, the operator co-operated with the enforcement investigation and took on board VE Davies鈥� advice following his visit in March 2025, outsourcing maintenance and implementing new systems. There is evidence of investment in IT systems and fleet upgrades and evidence that changes made have been effective, with VE Davies finding significant improvement in the records that he assessed between May and July 2025.

Balancing these negative and positive features and having regard to the Senior Traffic Commissioner鈥檚 Statutory Document 10 (鈥淪tat Doc 10鈥�), Annex 4, I consider this case to be in the 鈥渟evere to serious鈥� category. In determining whether the operator continues to satisfy the mandatory and continuing requirement to be of good repute in section 14ZA(2) of the Act I have had regard to Schedule 3 to that Act and the Senior Traffic Commissioner鈥檚 Statutory Document No. 1 on good repute.

Even when balancing the positives, I find that I am no longer able to trust the operator.聽 I simply do not believe the assurances given that it will operate compliantly in future. This is the third public inquiry the operator has been called to following unsatisfactory maintenance investigations by the DVSA, where maintenance arrangements, particularly brake testing arrangements have been of concern. Despite being given an opportunity to demonstrate that it could operate compliantly following the public inquiry in 2019, the operator was not doing so at the time of the VE investigation visit resulting in the public inquiry before me in September 2022.聽 I gave the operator another opportunity to demonstrate that it could operate compliantly and adhere to the previous undertaking given as to brake testing.聽 It did so for a time, as evidenced by the audit report in February 2023 but, once again, it was found not to be operating compliantly in 2024 when it was issued with an 鈥淪鈥� marked prohibition for serious brake defects and subsequent investigation earlier this year once again found it was not operating in compliance with the operator licensing regime.聽 鈥淚n Arnold Transport & Sons Ltd v DOENI (NT/2013/82)鈥� the Upper Tribunal said:

鈥淭he Tribunal has stated on many occasions that the operator licensing is based on trust.聽 Since it is impossible to police every operator and every vehicle at all times the Department in Northern Ireland (and Traffic Commissioners in GB), must feel able to trust operators to comply with all relevant parts of the operator licensing regime.聽 In addition, other operators must be able to trust their competitors to comply, otherwise they will no longer compete on a level playing field鈥�cutting corners all too easily leads to compromising safe operation.聽 It is important that operators understand that if their actions cast doubt on whether they can be trusted to comply with the regulatory regime they are likely to be called to a Public Inquiry at which their fitness to hold an operator鈥檚 licence will be called into question.聽 It will become clear, in due course, that fitness to hold an operator鈥檚 licence is an essential element of good repute.鈥�

I ask myself the question posed in 鈥淧riority Freight (2009/225)鈥�, 鈥渉ow likely is it that this operator will, in future, operate in compliance with the operator鈥檚 licensing regime?鈥� I have had regard to the failures I have found proved which are serious and persistent.聽 The operator has failed to heed two earlier warnings given at public inquiries in 2019 and 2022.聽 It has given assurances and undertakings which it has failed to honour 鈥� particularly as to brake testing 鈥� not once, but twice.聽 It cannot seek to blame its failings in that regard on the former transport manager, Mr Davie. Both Mr Hughes and Mr Williams were present at the last public inquiry where they gave assurances that the compliance failings found would not be repeated and, specifically, that the bespoke undertaking as to brake testing attached to the licence in 2019, would be honoured.聽 They were aware that Mr Davie鈥檚 repute as transport manager was found tarnished in 2022 and that the responsibility for complying fell to them as directors of the operating company.聽 In view of the repeated failures, I therefore consider it unlikely that the operator will comply in the future.

I have considered the evidence of Anthony Hughes and submissions from Mr Woodcraft as to the effect of regulatory action that I might take against the operator licence. That is that revocation of the licence would certainly affect the minibus part of the business which would be left in 鈥渁 hell of a lot of mess鈥� with 8 drivers to be laid off.聽 However, the other aspect of the business 鈥� the business of operating taxis, currently managed by the other two directors (Germaine Hughes and Elizabeth Williams) - would continue. In submissions, Mr Woodcraft invited me to consider drawing back from revocation of the licence whilst recognising that I would no doubt consider that there would need to be regulatory action taken which had a material impact on the business. He indicated that a licence suspension would have the same effect as revocation, given that 8 out of the 9 contracts for the PSVs were for school transport for Carmarthenshire Council.聽 He invited me to consider a reduction in the number of vehicles authorised for use on the licence, with a suitable time given for disruption to be minimised.聽

In considering the question posed in 鈥淏ryan Haulage (No.2) (2002/217)鈥�: is the conduct of the operator such that it ought to be put out of business? I had regard to the evidence and to Stat Doc 10. The operator has clearly compromised road safety and obtained a commercial advantage over other operators by persistently failing to keep its vehicles fit and serviceable. The passengers it carries are amongst the most vulnerable in our society, school children with special needs.聽 The starting point for regulatory action is 鈥渟evere to serious鈥�.聽 I also take the view that other operators who carry out their business in a compliant manner would be shocked if another operator were permitted to operate against this background.聽 In the circumstances of this case, it is appropriate and proportionate to answer the 鈥淏ryan Haulage鈥� question in the affirmative.聽 I find that the operator has lost its good repute and I direct that the licence is revoked pursuant to adverse findings in terms of sections 14ZA(2), 17(1)(a), 17(3)(a), (aa), and (c) of the Act.聽 To allow for an orderly running down of the business and to minimise disruption for pupils, parents and Carmarthenshire Council I direct that revocation of the licence shall take effect from 23:45 hours on 24 October 2025, the last day of term before the October half term break.

I have given careful consideration to disqualification and to the guidance in Stat Doc 10.聽 I have also reminded myself of the authority in 鈥淒avid Finch Haulage (2010/29)鈥�.聽 In that case, the Transport Tribunal said: 鈥淭he imposition of a period of disqualification is not a step to be taken routinely, but nor is it a step to be shirked if the circumstances render disqualification necessary in pursuit of the objectives of the operator licensing system.聽 Although no additional feature is required over and above the grounds leading up to revocation, an operator is entitled to know why the circumstances of the case are such as to make a period of disqualification necessary鈥︹��.

Taking account of all the circumstances and giving credit for the positives that I have found, in particular the steps taken by the operator following the adverse findings of the DVSA earlier this year 鈥� albeit this were made too little and too late - I draw back from making an order of disqualification.

Considerations and Decisions in respect of transport manager David Anthony Evans

David Evans was unable to demonstrate that he had complied with his duty effectively and continuously to manage the transport activities of Call A Cab (Carmarthenshire)聽 Ltd, as required by legislation.聽 There were serious failures found by the DVSA which occurred on his watch as a professionally qualified transport manager. The role of the transport manager is a key one which David Evans has failed to fulfil effectively, resulting in compliance failures and a clear risk to road safety.聽 He acknowledged the precious nature of the passengers carried by the operator, who include his own son, and that their safety is paramount and was compromised.

In considering the good repute of David Evans as transport manger I performed the same balancing act as set out above with reference to the negative findings and features that I have already set out above.聽 I have also considered the positive features to be weighed in the balance.聽 Mr Evans did take steps following the DVSA adverse report, which was directly critical of him as transport manager, to address the shortcomings that were found. He realised following the DVSA intervention that he needed to improve his skills and knowledge as transport manager and he embraced the advice given by the DVSA, which he found invaluable.聽 He was a new transport manager and recognises now that he placed too much trust in others and did not carry out his duties continuously and effectively to manage fundamental aspects of the transport operation 鈥� particularly as to maintenance inspections and brake testing. He has updated his knowledge by signing up to relevant gov.uk updates, familiarising himself with the requirements of the GTMR and joining online transport manager groups. The recent maintenance records reviewed by VE Davies for the period prior to the public inquiry showed significant improvement.

In considering whether his good repute is lost, rather than merely tarnished, I have had regard to relevant Upper Tribunal case law, including Angus Smales trading as Angus Smales Eventing (2014/058) when the Upper Tribunal confirmed that being a transport manager is far more than just holding the qualification. I find that David Evans was not demonstrating the ability to meet the statutory duty. In the circumstances, and as was confirmed in Matthew Reynolds (2015/049), I must find that he has lost his repute as transport manager and no longer satisfies the requirements of section 14ZA(3) of the Act to be of good repute in accordance with Schedule 3 to the Act.聽 I have considered whether such a finding would be a disproportionate response but consider that it is entirely proportionate and, indeed, inevitable on the evidence before me.

Having concluded that David Evans鈥� good repute is lost I must also disqualify him under paragraph 7B(2) of Schedule 3 to the Act from acting as a transport manager on an operator鈥檚 licence.聽 The disqualification is for a period of one year.聽 I do not set any formal rehabilitation measures, however he would be well advised to work with an experienced CPC holder exercising transport manager duties if he is to seek to persuade a Traffic Commissioner that he is capable of meeting the statutory duty in the future.

Victoria Davies

Traffic Commissioner for Wales

23 September 2025